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Before coming to substance, a brief introductory remark: Although the paper claims to be
deliberately provocative, I found only one really provocative statement in it, on the bottom of
the first page, namely that the paper is „nuanced“.
“Nuanced” is certainly a matter of perspective.  The paper’s narrow-minded view may be
helpful for a perspective centering on the United Kingdom or the United States where the
development has gone far in the direction of private defined contribution (DC) plans.
However, this is not the world, and this a World Bank conference.  In fact, there are many
parts of the world - actually a majority of the countries - which have only one monolithic
public defined benefit (DB) system, and this paper does little to do justice to the many
attempts of starting small moves towards more balanced systems which combine elements of
public defined benefit and private defined contribution (DC) plans.  A nuanced view would
take at least a bit of a glimpse on the problems of those countries.  I say this with quite a bit of
frustration as a European, specifically as a German, where in spite of all kinds of serious
troubles ahead the reform towards a more balanced system has been stalled over and again.
This brings me to my first substantive point.
1. Demographic constraints are serious
Demographic changes will increase implicit public debt in a way that is unsustainable even
for rich countries. Thus, prefunding in the broad sense as defined in the paper by Orszag and
Stiglitz is a simple necessity.
This is an important point!  The paper misses this or at least its fundamental significance for
the debate.  The paper actually minimizes this fundamental political constraint by somewhat
loosely referring to the illusion that the choice of prefunding or not is only a matter of
“intergenerational trade-offs“.  For many countries, this is simply wrong because the future
payroll taxes will reach levels that are unsustainable and will not permit any tradeoff.
Again, the perspective is important.  In spite of all the discussions in the U.S. congress, the
U.S. demography is relatively harmless.  The US expects to have a dependency ratio in 2030
that is as high as in many countries today.  However, in those countries the dependency ratio
will continue to double from this high level until the year 2030, seriously constraining policy
options.
2. Corporate governance of public investment
Given that we need to prefund in the broad sense, the remaining core question is whether
prefunding should be done publicly or privately.  Orszag and Stiglitz advocate public
investment.  As opposed to the title of the conference, this is not a new idea.  It has been done
before with results which have been documented quite a few times.  Examples are the
provident funds in Asia which have rather low returns even after the correction done in the
paper.  Other examples are the partially funded systems in the Middle East where funds were
frequently squandered in order to finance dubious public investment projects.
But there is a more subtle point, namely the question who should exert corporate governance.
In order to answer this question it is important to get volumes right.  Let me pick up the
German example.  In order to fund 50% of Germany´s pension claims, the fund would be
about 1/3 of current gross fixed capital stock.  The political economy of a government running
such a significant share of the economy is well known and not favorable.  There are plenty
discouraging examples in France, Italy and Sweden, so I do not have to mention the many
countries in the former East and in developing countries.
There is the illusion that the government can just passively invest in index fonds.  This
illusion is shared, by the way, also by a proposal put forwarded by Franco Modigliani
recently.  This will not work.  Somebody has to enforce corporate governance – either the
owner of the capital directly or her agents.  Direct control is out of the question for most
workers and pensioners.  So the central question is what motivates the agent, in the case
proposed by Orszag and Stiglitz the government.  I do not see any compelling corporate
governance mechanism that guarantees market rates of return in this case.
3. Political risks versus capital market risks
Belittleling political risks and being cavalier with political economy questions is another
worrisome tendency in the argumentation of the paper by Orszag and Stiglitz.  I find the
discussion in Myths # 8, # 9 and # 10 on the political economy particularly troublesome.
While it is quite correct that the regulation of capital markets is imperfect and subject to
corruption and ignorance, it is by no means a logical conclusion that therefore one might as
well leave all governance to the state.  There is a clear hierarchy and a division of labor.  It
starts from day-to-day management, continues to the supervisory role of the governors, and
finally end at the establishment of a regulatory environment by the government.  The closer
the state is to day-to-day management, the more problematic has it been, as has been proved
over and over again in history all across the world.
Again, the discussion is very North American centered and misses the reality in most
developing countries (but even in large parts of Western Europe) where a large share of GDP
is government-related and deregulation is slow.  Just to give some real life examples: In
Germany, a board of state appointed but independent trustees overseeing a third of the capital
stock, as proposed by Orszag and Stiglitz, is wishful thinking in the light of the fact that the
social security actuaries have recently adjusted their demographic forecast to match the long-
term budget limits of the public pension system. And Germany is not the only country (add
certain non-government organizations!) in which demographic projections are treated as
political, not scientific exercises.
4. Incentive effects on participation and internal rates of return
In the sake of time, let me be very brief on Myths # 5 and # 6, related to economic incentive
effects.  Orszag and Stiglitz are very right that labor supply disincentives are not necessarily
implications of public DB plans.  But this is theory.  In practise, two significant effects  -
participation effects and early retirement effects -  dominate almost all existing public defined
benefit plans, even if they are partially funded.
Concerning participation incentives, evidence in many countries shows that participation
declains as soon as public DB plans become voluntary.  “Opting out” has been overwhelming
in Hungary, the United Kingdom and the Latin America reform countries.  In a similar
fashion, public opinion policies on public DB plans yield miserable grades.
The negative incentive effects on participating in public DB plans are governed by the
perceived rate of return differences vis-a-vis capital market returns.  The paper by Orszag and
Stiglitz is quite correct in dismissing superficial comparisons, particularly if transition costs
are ignored.  But this does not leave rates of return under PAYG DB plans and fully funded
DC plans equivalent.  Again, I am missing a more subtle (may I say “nuanced”) approach to
this question.  The equivalence of maintaining the PAYG system and a transition to a fully
funded system shown by Breyer (1989), Brunner (1994), Fenge (1995) and others only holds
in very simple economies that work frictionless (e.g., perfect capital markets) and have a fixed
technology.  If there are liquidity constraints, diversification constraints, or if the technology
changes because productivity is affected by changes in the pension system (Cosetti, 1994),
these results do not hold and provide room for a genuine difference in the rates of return.
5. Incentive effects on early retirement and the political economy
In terms of early retirement, it should be stressed that the United States is an outlier.  Most
other countries in the Gruber and Wise (1999) volume have not managed, or did not want, to
make their defined benefit plans actuarially fair.  This is not by chance but has systematic
reasons, namely a link to unemployment policies  - the false belief that reducing old age labor
force participation will reduce unemployment because labor is a fixed lump -  and pork
barrels politics  - because in many countries the elderly are the largest special interest group
among votes, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999).
Getting quarrels such as about actuarially adjustments out of the day-to-day special interest
politics into the realm of actuaries and insurance managers is an important reason to move
away from pure public DB plans – may be not all the way. Here are exactly the nuances
missing that the paper claims to deliver.
6. Political risks versus capital market risks, revisited
This brings us back to the question of political risks.  In being so one-sided, the paper also
misses the point that defined benefits are not defined benefits anyway.  It is simply a myth
that defined benefit plans carry no risk.  And it is simply a myth that any pension system can
be risk-free.  Public DB plans have an enormous political risk.  Social security benefits have
been changed up and down for all kinds of reasons in the major EU countries as can be
studied in the many institutional comparisons available.  Once again: This paper should have
left the U.S. perspective to include the European, Latin America or North African experience.
Two examples: In spite of being “defined benefit” plans, in most countries it is not possible to
get an official statement of what these defined benefits are for a specific individual.  This
includes my own country.  And taking another example from Germany: during the last eight
months future pension benefits have been increased and reduced again by 15% when laws
were revoked and administrative rules changed to fit budget requirements.
On top of this, indexation to inflation is discretionary and subject to pork-barrell politics in
most developing countries and even some European countries.  Of course, it is not a necessary
feature of public DB plans in theory. In reality, however, governments are rare by binding
themselves.  The historical evidence quite clearly shows that governments prefer to keep their
ability to make discretionary policy.
I do not want to belittle the risk inherent in private DC plans.  All things considered, this very
much speaks for a multi-pillar system in which one part is run by the state and might be pay-
as-you-go or funded, another part are individual funded accounts.  Very obviously – since
capital market and political risks are unlikely to be perfectly correlated – a combination
reduces overall risk.  The balance between political risk and capital market risk is not only
country-specific (as the paper points out quite correctly and repeatedly) but will also vary
within countries from rich to poor and according to preferences.  It is thus important to give
the people some choice of how much the second pillar is investing in public bonds or private
equities, very much along the lines of Tony Blair´s stakeholder pension idea.
7. Whom to Trust?
The fundamental disagreement in our debate is on which choices to leave the people, and
whom the people should trust.  If we take the historical evidence, in most countries – maybe
the U.S. is an exception -  governments have had a rather bad track record when they were
trusted with running large funds.  We have to bite part of this bullet for redistributional tasks
because there is no way to organize this differently but through the state.  However, it is not
necessary to bite all of this bullet, in particular for the non- redistributive bulk of the old-age
insurance as this paper – with much too few nuances – suggests.
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